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SUPREME COURT REVIEW
FOREWORD-THE MORALITY OF THE
CRIMINAL LAW: RIGHTS OF THE
ACCUSED
DAVID L. BAZELON*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Recent developments in the criminal law have occurred against a
background of mounting public anxiety about violent street crime.
Leading politicians have proclaimed crime a priority rivaling even inflation and defense.' As the sense of urgency intensifies, the desperate
search for answers quickens. Virtually every day, a politician, editorial
writer, or criminal justice professional offers a new prescription for ending crime.
I believe the discussion currently raging over criminal justice issues
can best be understood by focusing upon a central question: Must we
compromise the most basic values ofour democraticsociety in our desperationtofight
crime? I have elsewhere considered the implications of this question for
issues of criminal responsibility and for policy choices in the administration ofjustice.2 In this article, I will examine the ways in which different
answers to this fundamental question can affect the development of legal doctrine, particularly with respect to the constitutional rights of
those accused of crime.
First, I will describe two polar positions on the question of morality
*

Senior Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia

Circuit.
1 See, e.g., Controlof Violent Crime i 'ChiefPriori,'Smith Sqys, JusT. ASSISTANCE NEws,
June/July 1981, at I;A Tak With Edwin Aeese, Washington Post, July 7, 1981, at A15, col. 2.

US Developing Plans to Combat Violent Crimes, N. Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1981, at A1, col. 5.
2 Bazelon, Crime: Towarda Constretive Debate, 67 A.B.A.J. 438 (1981); Bazelon, The Moraliy ofthe Criminal Law, 49 S. CAL. L. REv. 385 (1976) [hereinafter cited as The Morali&y ofthe
CriminalLaw]. ee also Morse, The Twilight of Welfare Criminology: A Rep.4' tofudge Baze/on, 49
S. CAL. L. REv. 1247 (1976); Bazelon, The Morality ofthe CriminalLaw: A Rejoinder to Professor
Morse, 49 S. CAL. L. REv. 1269 (1976); Morse, The Twilight of Welfare Criminologv: A Final
Word, 49 S. CAL. L. R-v. 1275 (1976).
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in criminal law. I will then outline the ways in which each position
defines the goals of criminal procedure. Finally, I will consider the implications of each position with respect to the fourth, fifth, and sixth
amendments.
II.

Two

VIEWS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW

I have suggested that there are two distinct approaches to the criminal law. 3 Both begin with the notion that establishing some sort of order is a moral imperative in civilized society. There can be no moral
development in a world in which the mighty prey on the weak. What
separates the two positions are the means they would employ to achieve
order and, ultimately, the types of order they seek.
The first view, which enjoys the greatest currency in the political
arena today, holds that order can best be achieved through the imposition of strong external constraints. It demands that the criminal law
punish disorder and make the cost of violating the law so great that few
will dare to do so. This view, and the cluster of beliefs associated with it,
4
I have called the "law-as-external-constraint" thesis.
The alternative thesis is that the law's aims must be achieved by a
moral process which recognizes the realities of social and economic injustice. This philosophy sees externally imposed order-repressive order-as suffering from the same basic defect as "disorder": both lack
moral authority. Furthermore, this philosophy asserts that an order
built on fear of punishment cannot long endure. To be truly moral and
lasting, according to this second philosophy, order must derive from the
internalization of control, that is, on the members of society obeying the
law because they personally believe that its commands are justified.
Thus, this view demands that the law facilitate the internalization process by becoming a moral force in the community. Lest there be any
doubt, I should state at the outset that I associate myself with this view.
A.

GOALS OF THE CRIMINAL PROCESS: THE EXTERNAL
CONSTRAINT VIEW

The "externalists" premise their analysis of criminal procedure on
the assumption that most criminal acts are the products of the actor's
free choice. Professor Ralph Slovenko summarized this view in a recent
letter to The New York Times:
3 Bazelon, The Moraliy ofthe CriminalLaw, supra note 2, at 386-87. Two somewhat different models of the criminal justice system are elaborated in Packer, Two Models ofthe Crminal
Process, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1964). See also Packer, The Cour the Police, andthe Rest of Us, 57
J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 238 (1966). Like Packer's, my models are intended to exemplify polar
theoretical positions; in practice, of course, elements of both are important.
4 Bazelon, The Morality of the Ciminal Law, supra note 2, at 386.
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Crime has gotten out of control because criminal activity is attractive. It's

easy. Profits are tax-free and penalties are minimal .... The offenders
who are making life miserable for us are criminals by choice. They have
chosen to be burglars or robbers, just as one may choose to be a lawyer or a
doctor.5
The externalists contend that the criminal justice system can deter
these "rational" actors by assuring "swift and certain consequences" for
unlawful behavior. As Professor James Q. Wilson explains, "if the expected cost of crime goes up without a corresponding increase in the
expected benefits, then the would-be criminal-unless he or she is
among that small fraction of criminals who are utterly irrational--engages in less crime." 6

In order to achieve the deterrent effect, the criminal process must
identify and punish the guilty with speed and surety. The late Herbert
Packer compares the process to an assembly line. 7 For the externalist,
then, the measure of the process lies in its eftiengy andfnality. The efficiency principle demands that waste and delay be reduced. Criminals
must be identified, apprehended, tried, convicted, and punished as rapidly as possible. The finality principle places a premium on the assurance "that there will at some point be the certainty that comes with an
end to litigation. . ... 8 Once we are reasonably sure we have identi-

fied the guilty, the need for certainty demands that we cut off opportunities to challenge the process.
In this model, attention to procedural niceties-before, during, and
after trial-must be carefully restrained, lest they clog up the system.
The extemalists believe that the primary purpose of constitutional safeguards is "to insure that the innocent are not wrongly convicted. . .. "9
Thus, procedures are important mainly as a means of accomplishing the
overriding goal of the criminal law: swift and certain separation of the
guilty from the innocent.
This is not to suggest that the externalists have little solicitude for
the rights of the accused; rather that in the extemalist model, the "costs"
of procedural safeguards (delay and uncertainty) cannot outweigh their
"benefit" (protecting the innocent). When an expansion of constitutional requirements advances the determination of guilt only marginally, "belief in the efficacy of the system of justice declines." 10 At that
5 Slovenko, Thq Are Criminals0 Choice, N. Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1981, at 22, col. 4.

j. Q. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 197 (1977).
Packer, Two Models of the CriminalProcess, sutira note 3, at 13.
8 Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
9 Letter from Nicholas deB. Katzenbach to David L. Bazelon (June 24, 1965), reprintedin
Kamisar, Hasthe Court Left the Allorn GeneralBehind?-The Bazelon-KatenbachLetters on Povero,
6

7

Equality and the Administration of CriminalJustice, 54 Ky. L. J. 464, 491 (1966).
10 M. FLEMING, THE PRICE OF PERFECT JUSTiCE 6 (1974).
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point of "diminishing returns," the externalists contend, procedures
must give way to efficiency and finality.
Thus, externalists believe that convictions should not be reversed
for "procedural irregularities" if the defendant-appellant was "guilty
anyhow." Collateral attacks on unfair procedures should not be entertained unless the petitioner makes a colorable claim of innocence.'1 In
short, the goal of an ordered society-which it is thought will be
achieved through deterrence-must transcend procedural means. Recently Mayor Koch of New York expressed this view concisely:
"The rights of defendants have to be protected," he said, "but the rights of
society are paramount. I believe in the old-fashioned standard, which is
that if it is to have any meaning, justice requires that when you have a
defendant who is apprehended and
convicted, there is the expectation and
12
the realization of punishment."
B.

GOALS OF THE CRIMINAL PROCESS: THE LAW
AND MORALITY VIEW

Unlike Mayor Koch, those of us who believe the law must encourage internalization of control do not view questions of criminal procedure as requiring a choice between the rights of defendants and the
"rights of society." In the long run, society requires a genuine, lasti7g
order. That kind of order, I am convinced, can better be built on respect for the law than on fear of punishment. Professor Anthony Amsterdam summarized this notion in a letter he wrote to me more than
fifteen years ago:
For the most part, encouraging obedience and punishing disobedience are
mutually consistent, even mutually supporting means. They cease to be
consistent when the powers given officials to apprehend and punish the
disobedient are so unconstrained
that their exercise arouses citizen resent3
ment and contempt for law.'
By "trading-off" the rights of the accused in favor of the needs of immediate safety, the externalists may embrace procedures that cannot command, and do not deserve, voluntary compliance. In that event, everincreasing repression may be necessary to maintain a fragile order based
on fear.
In contrast, I believe the criminal process must strive to attain a
moral force that entitles it to respect. With Judge Elbert Tuttle, I believe
11

Se, e.g., Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelant? CollateralAttackon CriminalJudgments,38 U. CHI.
L. REv. 142 (1970). See also The Supreme Courr, 1978 Tem, 93 HARv. L. Rav. 62, 217-18

(1979).
12 Koch Seeks Poliq Role to Toughen Administration of CrimialJustice,N. Y. Times, Nov. 16,
1980, at 42, col. 1.
13 Letter from Anthony G. Amsterdam to David L. Bazelon, July 2, 1965, reprintedin
Kamisar, supra note 9, at 498.
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"the only way the law has progressed from the days of the rack, the
,14 In
screw and the wheel is the development of moral concepts ....
fundamenthree
by
be
guided
must
law
criminal
my view, a truly moral
tal principles:
* First, the criminal process must always remain sensitive to the
social realities that underlie crime.
e Second, it must make meaningful the claim of "equal justice
under law."
* Third, it must, through a process of constant questioning, force
the community to confront the painful realities and agonizing choices
posed by social injustice. I call these the principles of reality, equality, and
education.
1. The realitypinciple
Former Justice Arthur Goldberg, writing in these pages nearly ten
years ago, stated that the Supreme Court's criminal procedure decisions
should be judged, in part, by asking "whether the Court has dealt in
realities, and not in legal fictions." 1 5 My experience of thirty-two years
on the bench has confirmed the importance of this reality principle.
Truly moral judgments cannot rest on philosophical abstractions, but
must be derived from the facts which generate human behavior in the
real world.
An effort to understand these realities must begin by precisely identifying the problem that terrifies Americans. -The emotionalism and
near-desperation that attend contemporary discussions about criminal
justice do not, after all, derive from a generalized concern about all
types of crime. White-collar crime, for instance, costs society untold billions of dollars-far more than street crime. Yet it does not instill the
kind of fear reflected in the recent explosion of "get-tough" proposals.
Those sorts of crimes, committed by the middle- and upper-classes, by
"[p]eople who look like one's next-door neighbor," 16 do not, by and
large, threaten our physical safety or the sanctity of our homes.
Nor does organized crime instill fear in most Americans. Hired
guns largely kill each other. The common citizen does not lock his doors
in fear that he may be the object of gang warfare. Organized crime
unquestionably does contribute to street crime, most obviously through
drug trafficking. The solution to organized crime lies in exposing its
links with the political and financial worlds. But as much as it should,
Novak v. Beto, 453 F.2d 661,672 (5th Cir. 1971) (TuttleJ., concurring and dissenting),
cert denied, 409 U.S. 968 (1972).
15 Goldberg, Foreword-TheBurger Court 1971 Terr: One Step Forward,Two Steps Backward.?,
63 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 463, 464 (1972).
16 C. SILBERMAN, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 41 (1978).
14
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organized crime has certainly not produced the recent hysteria over
crime. Similarly, crimes of passion, however celebrated they may be, do
not cause people to bolt their doors at night. To do so would be to lock
the fox inside the chicken coop.
Rather, it is the random assault of violent street cimes that Americans
fear. The muggings, the rapes, the purse snatchings, and the knifings
that plague city life have put us in mortal fear for our property and
lives.
Having focused on exactly the kind of crime we fear, the reality
principle requires identification of the offenders. This is not a pleasant
task. The real sources of street crime are associated with a constellation
of suffering so hideous that society cannot bear to look it in the face.
Yet, as Emerson said, "God offers to every mind its choice between truth
and repose." However painful it may be, we cannot aspire to a genuinely moral society unless we choose truth.
Nobody questions that street criminals typically come from the bottom of the socioeconomic ladder, from among the ignorant, the ill-educated, the unemployed and the unemployable.17 A recent study of exoffenders revealed that "experimentally induced unemployment does increase arrests for both property and nonproperty crimes" and concluded
that "[p]overty is apparently causally related to crime at the individual
level."'
The National Institute of Justice recently confirmed that
America's prison population is disproportionately black. 19 The offenders at whom the current "get tough" programs are aimed come from an
underclass of brutal social and economic deprivation. Urban League
President Vernon Jordan calls them America's "boat people without
20
boats."
The aggregation of circumstances that leads some of these people to
crime is no mystery. They are born into families struggling to surviveif they have families at all. They are raised in deteriorating, overcrowded housing. They lack adequate nutrition and health care. They
are subjected to prejudice and educated in unresponsive schools.2 1 They
17 See general'y id. at 86-116.
18 Berk, Lenihan & Rossi, Cime and Povery: Some ExperimetalEvidenceftom Ex-Offenders, 45
AM. Soc. REV. 766, 784 (1980). See also NATIONAL ADVISORY COUNCIL ON ECONOMIC OPPORTUNrrY, TWELFTH REPORT: CRITICAL CHOICES FOR THE 80'S 58-59 (1980).
19 1 U.S. DEP'T JUST., NAT'L INST. JUST., AMERICAN PRISONS AND JAILS 159 (1980).

20 City Strategies,Washington Star, Feb. 18, 1981.
21 A graphic set of pictures of America's "underclass" emerges from two recent reports,
NATIONAL ADVISORY COUNCIL ON ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY, supira note 18, and M.
EDELMAN, PORTRAIT OF INEQUALITY, BLACK AND WHITE CHILDREN IN AMERICA

(1980).

The former concluded:
The official poverty population, approximately 25 million, has remained fairly constant
since 1969. Moreover,. . . the change in the ratio of poor to nonpoor has come almost
entirely through the expansion of "income transfer" and Federal antipoverty programs.
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are denied the sense of order, purpose, and self-esteem that makes lawabiding citizens. With nothing to preserve and nothing to lose, they
turn to crime for economic survival, a sense of excitement and accomplishment, and an outlet for frustration, desperation, and rage.
The Washington Post recently profiled one of the young armed robbers who has made our capital a city of fear. 22 I will certify, based on
my experience on the bench, that he is sadly typical. Elton Smith, black
and 18 years old, lives-when he's not in jail-in a public housing project wedged between the Anacostia River and an interstate highway in a
part of Washington few tourists ever visit. Most of his fellow residents
are on welfare. Post reporter Thomas Morgan described Smith's home
this way:
The hallway to his family's two-bedroom apartment, a pastiche of soul
food smells, mildew and trash, bustles with activity. Two teenagers, seeking privacy from noisy overcrowded apartments, huddle in a corner sharing secrets. A girl with pigtails sprawls across the stairway using a step as a
desk to do
homework as stereos inside several apartments blast music into
23
the hall.

Elton Smith's mother explains that the family lives in these surroundings because they cannot afford to go anywhere else. She tells the reporter that her boy has had problems with the law ever since she and his
father separated when he was thirteen years old. He has no skills, other
than as a robber, and has been unable to retain a steady job. In his
neighborhood, Elton Smith is a hero and a role model to kids who regard academic achievers as "sissies." And Smith himself offers a simple
explanation for his criminal activities: "I know the money does not belong to me," he says. "But the only way I can survive is [by] taking
[And] those who have moved out of poverty. . . hover just above the official poverty
line and, with the combination of spreading unemployment, soaring prices for life's necessities and cutbacks in human services budgets, many are falling back into poverty
every day.
NATIONAL ADVISORY COUNCIL ON ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY, supra note 18, at 147. The

Council also detailed the effects of unemployment. "There are clear correlations," it summarized, "between the rates of unemployment and increases in major social pathologies-ill
health, psychological impairment, psychiatric ailments, alcoholism, drug addiction, divorce,
infant mortality, child abuse, crime and suicide." Id. at 153.
Edelman's book reported some startling statistics. Among them:
A Black baby is three times as likely as a white baby to have a mother who dies in
childbirth and is twice as likely to be born to a mother who has had no prenatal care at
all. A Black infant is twice as likely as a white infant to die during the first year of
life. ... A Black child is more than two-and-one half times as likely as a white child to
live in dilapidated housing and twice as likely to be on welfare. . . . A Black child is
twice as likely as a white child to live with neither parent, three times as likely to be born
to a teenaged mother, seven times as likely to have parents who separate, and three times
as likely to see his father die.
M. EDELMAN, supra, at 7-8.
22 Youth Speak No Remorse, Washington Post, Dec. 14, 1980, at Al, col. 4.
23 Id. at All.
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money from someone else."'24
These are the ugly facts about so very much of American street
crime. A criminal process that ignores the social realities that underlie
crime is, at the least, amoral.
2.

The equality princdle

The equality pincipble follows logically from the reality principle.
Once we acknowledge the squalid conditions that breed street crime, we
can tolerate inequities in the criminal process only by donning moral
blinders. Of course, the ideal of "equal justice before the law" is as old as
the Republic itself. But the reality principle requires us to recognize
how far short we fall of the ideal. Reginald Smith's comments of more
than sixty years ago remain disturbingly accurate:
The administration of American justice is not impartial, the rich and the
poor do not stand on an equality before the law, the traditional method of
providing justice has operated to close the doors of the courts to the poor,
and has caused a25 gross denial of justice in all parts of the country to millions of persons.
Adherents of the "law-as-external-constraint" model regret, even
deplore, these inequities. But under that model, the criminal law must
punish the guilty with a maximum of efficiency and finality; social and
economic inequality is simply irrelevant to that process. Thus, even
President Johnson's Attorney General, who enthusiastically and admirably administered many of the civil rights and anti-poverty programs of
the mid-sixties, characterized as "ridiculous" my suggestion that criminal procedures should take steps to compensate for the disparities that
26
produce unequal access to constitutional rights.
The criminal law is, of course, closer to the ideal of equal justice
now than it was in Reginald Smith's day. At one time, the law, in its
majestic equality, permitted the rich as well as the poor an "equal opportunity" to retain private counsel, to hire investigators and expert witnesses, to purchase trial transcripts, and to pay fines. We put a set of
rights at our own eye level but ignored the fact that the growth of others
had been stunted by many circumstances, including the accident of
birth. Gradually, however, we have come to realize that "[tihere can be
no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the
amount of money he has."'27 With this reminder from Justice Black, we
24 Id. at Al.
25 R. SMrrH, JUSTICE AND THE POOR 8 (3d ed. reprint 1972).
26 Letter from Nicholas deB. Katzenbach to David L. Bazelon, repintedin Kamisar, supra

note 9, at 490.
27 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956) (opinion of Black, J.).
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have sought to give the stunted the assistance of a box on which to reach
our own eye level.
Yet, for many, the criminal process, while promising "Equal Justice
Under Law," continues to deliver only "Justice For Those Who Can
Afford It."' 28 The deprived know from bitter experience that when a
crime is committed, any one of them in the neighborhood might be suspected and arrested. And once they have entered the criminal justice
system, they are unlikely to receive the considerate treatment and light
punishment so frequently enjoyed by the well-to-do. For example, a
group of sociologists studying Florida criminal courts recently found
"that whites have an 18 percent greater chance in the predicted
probability of receiving probation than blacks when all other things are
equal." 29 The powerful, but not the weak, have effective assistance of
counsel from the earliest stages of the process. The powerful, but not the
weak, enjoy freedom from confinement pending their trials and appeals.
The powerful, but not the weak, receive respectful treatment trom
judges, prosecutors, policemen, and probation officers. The powerful,
but not the weak, undergo incarceration in the least restrictive prisons
available.
Charles Silberman has stated that, "[t]he double standard that
lower-class people see applied produces a deep-rooted cynicism about
'30
government, business, and indeed, American society as a whole."
There can be no doubt that this conviction on the part of the disadvantaged that "the system" is against them contributes substantially to the
sullen, defiant hostility which flashes out in urban crime. The rules
which govern the relationship between the disadvantaged and the official power of the state cannot perpetuate this unfairness. Criminal procedures should be a haven of equality for those whose life history-of
poverty, discrimination, callous disregard-teaches them that they are
not equal. Without a meaningful commitment to the equality principle,
we cannot begin to aspire to a moral order grounded in the will and
hearts of the people rather than in fear of punishment.
In short, a criminal process worthy of moral respect must always
follow Learned Hand's "commandment": "Thou shalt not ration
'3 1
justice."
28 United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196, 264 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (DecosterIII) (Bazelon, J.,'
dissenting), cerl. denied, 444 U.S. 944 (1979).
29 Unnever, Frazier, & Henretta, Race Diffrences in CriminalSentencing,21 Soc. Q. 197, 204
(1980).
30 C. SILBERMAN, suira note 16, at 108.
31 Hand, "Thou Shalt Not RationJustice," 9 LEGIs. AID BRIEF CASE 3 (1951).
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The educationpincple

Without a vigorous dedication to the equality principle, the rules of
criminal procedure cannot earn the moral respect of those who now suffer inequities in the administration of justice. But the reality principle
demands that we acknowledge that sole reliance on the criminal law,
however nobly conceived, will not "solve" violent street crime. In the
end, the institutions of criminal justice act as mere janitors, tidying up
the human and social wreckage that happens to end up in a courtroom.
They cannot begin to cure the conditions that drive people like Elton
Smith to crime.
But these institutions can help society pursue a moral order by
pushing those conditions into high public visibility. By probing the sordid realities that underlie its cases, the criminal justice system can force
the society to confront and address the facts about street crime. And by
articulating constitutional rights in ways that clearly and constantly reaffirm our fundamental values, the criminal law can keep those values
at the forefront of social consciousness-thus encouraging humane and
intelligent responses to the crime problem. I call this the education
principle.
I differ fundamentally with the externalists in what I expect from
the criminal law. The exclusionary rule, Miranda, and aspects of habeas
corpus have all come under attack in the name of "swift and certain"
punishment. 32 But in relying on "reform" of the criminal process to
deter crime, the externalists, in my view, travel a superhighway leading
to a cow path. A relatively small percentage of street crimes are reported to the police and thus enter the criminal justice system.3 3 Of that
group, only a small portion results in arrest. 34 It is utter folly to expect
32 See, e.g., Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus For State Pironers, 76
HARv. L. REV. 441 (1963); Kaus, Abolish the 5th Amendment, WASHINGTON MONTHLY, Dec.
1980, at 12; Wilkey, The exclusionay rule: why suppress valid evidence? 62 JUDICATURE 214
(1978).
The recent report of the Attorney General's Task Force on Violent Crime included several proposals for changing the criminal justice system. Among other things, the Task Force
recommended building more prisons, denying bail to "dangerous" offenders, modifying the
exclusionary rule to permit "good faith" claims by the police, and limiting habeas corpus
petitions. See CRIMINAL JUST. NEWSLETTER, Aug. 31, 1981, at 5. I have commented elsewhere on what we might expect from similar proposals. See Bazelon, Cime: TowardaConstrective Debate, supra note 2.
33 U.S. DEP'T JUST. LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE AD., CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN

THE UNITED STATES 7-9 (1976).
34 See C. SILBERMAN, supra note 16, at 259. See also Police in N.Y Cut Back, Arrest Fewer as
Crime Rises, N. Y. Times, July 5, 1981, at 1, col. 3. Of course, the difficulty of accurately
measuring crime is well known. See C. SILBERMAN, supra note 16, at 447-55; Kamisar, How to

Use, Abuse--and Fight Back with-Crime Statisticr, 25 OKLA. L. REV. 239 (1972).
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changes in the procedures that govern those cases meaningfully to affect
the crime rate.
More importantly, even if the criminal process could achieve the
threat of certain punishment, it would have little impact on the people
at the bottom of society's ladder. As Diana Gordon, Executive Vice
President of the National Council on Crime and Delinquency, has
noted, prison must pose an empty threat to one whose urban environment is itself a prison.3 5 Elton Smith candidly admitted that punishment would not stop him from committing future robberies. "They
can't keep me in jail forever," he told the Washington Post. "If they let
me out tomorrow, I might be tempted to do the same thing all over
'3 6
again to survive if I don't have a job. I really believe that.
Thus we court disaster if we persuade ourselves that changing the
criminal process will provide the "answer" to street crime. Moreover, if
we expect miracles from such reforms, we may put far more important
tasks on the back burner. Repairing the machinery of criminal procedures cannot substitute for a substantial attack on the uninhabitable
housing, insufficient food, medieval medical care and inadequate educations suffered by the people who commit street crimes. No matter how
we modify criminal procedures, we cannot rely upon the criminal justice
system as the primary agency to solve these problems. Other institutions, better adapted to broadscale programs and more responsive to
changing conditions, must address the grinding oppression around us.
These conditions cannot be ignored simply because the great majority of
those who endure them do not disturb our sleep and threaten our lives.
What the criminal process can do is bring the submerged realities of
crime to the surface so that the responsible institutions will address
them.3 7 By incessantly asking questions, courts can do a substantial
amount to ensure that the agencies which are supposed to be dealing
with a particular problem are actually looking for answers, instead of
simply taking action out of prejudice or ignorance. And courts, by constantly reminding society of the constitutional values that underlie specific decisions, can help ensure that the responsible institutions take
action consistent with our best moral instincts. Like Justice Douglas, I
believe "[t]he judiciary plays an important role in educating the people
as well as in deciding cases.1"38
Our best hope of achieving a truly moral social order lies in seeking
35

D.

GORDON, TowARD REALSTIc REFORM:

A

COMMENTARY ON PROPOSALS FOR

CHANGE IN NEw YORK CITY'S CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
36 Youth Speaks No Remorse, supra note 22, at Al l, col. 1.

5 (1981).

37 See Bazelon, New Godsfor Old" 'fft'nt" Courts in a DemocraticSodety, 46 N.Y.U. L. REv.
653, 654-57 (1971).
38 W. DOUGLAS, WE THE JUDGES 443 (1956).

1154

DAVID L BAZELON

[Vol. 72

out the causes of the criminal act. The criminal process-from arrest to
sentencing-resembles a post-mortem: A post-mortem cannot revive the
dead, and the criminal process cannot undo a heinous act. But in each
procedure we can attempt to discover the cause of failure. Of course,
eliciting the information necessary to understand the forces that drive
people to commit crime will not "cure" the disease. Once we improve
our understanding, we will still need to decide whether the costs of grappling with the roots of crime are more than we are willing to pay. But
society can never hope to achieve a just and lasting solution to crime
without first facing the facts that underlie it. For, as Justice Cardozo
once wrote, "[t]he subject the most innocent on the surface may turn out
'3 9
when it is probed to be charged with hidden fire."
The education principle measures the quality and morality of the
criminal justice system by how well it searches for and reveals those realities and by how forcibly it reminds society of our basic moral and constitutional values. A criminal law that makes these efforts, constantly
and faithfully, can "mark and measure the stored up strength of a nation, and [stand as] sign, and proof of the living virtue within it."40
III.

ISSUES IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:

THE

Two

VIEWS

In my view, many of the pervasive issues of modern criminal procedure can be analyzed in terms of the two contrasting philosophies outlined above. By assigning very different purposes to the criminal
process, these two approaches offer distinct ways of resolving some of the
recurring dilemmas posed in the adjudication of constitutional rights.
In this part, I will try to show how doctrinal choices in fourth, fifth, and
sixth amendment cases often reduce to tensions between the values of
efficiency and finality, on the one hand, and the principles of reality,
equality, and education, on the other.
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

A.

At the end of last term, Justice Powell called the fourth amendment 41 a "benighted area of the law."'42 Some might think this characterization too kind. Perhaps more than in any other aspect of criminal
procedure, the complexity and confusion surrounding the rules of search
and seizure persistently cloud understanding. I have no desire to usurp
the Court's unenviable struggle to develop a body of sound and stable
doctrine in this area. Rather, I wish to demonstrate the ways in which
39

B.

CARDOZO, LAW AND LITERATURE 130 (1931).

40 Statement of Winston Churchill, quotedin Goldberg, supra note 15, at 464.
41 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

42 Robbins v. California, 101 S. Ct. 2841, 2851 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring).
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that struggle reflects a conflict between the two philosophies I have
described.
Much of the bewildering quality of fourth amendment jurisprudence derives from the necessity of drawing lines that give content to the
prohibition against "unreasonable searches and seizures." For example,
does the use of a telescope constitute a "search" but not the use of binoculars? 43 Can the police enter the hallway of an apartment building uninvited but not the hallway of a one-family home?44 Under any view of
the purposes of criminal law, these lines must be drawn with enough
clarity to permit comprehension by citizens, police, and lower courts.
Thus, I take as common ground the importance of establishing relatively "bright lines."
But there are bright lines and bright lines. The externalists seek
lines that will further the goals of efficiency and finality and thus advance the cause of swift and certain punishment. Law enforcement,
they fear, will be slowed or inhibited if policemen must wrestle with
vague and unpredictable constitutional requirements at the scene of
each search and seizure. 45 For those who see the law as encouraging the
internalization of control, on the other hand, bright lines can enhance
the morality of the criminal process to the extent that they reflect the
reality, equality, and education principles. These different approaches
will, in many cases, produce differences in determining how to draw the
line.
Two companion cases decided at the very end of the Supreme
Court's last Term illustrate this point. Both Robbins v. Califomia46 and
New York v.Belton 47 involved a familiar fact pattern. In each case, patrolmen stopped a car on the highway, detained the occupants, smelled
marihuana, and searched the car. The California officers found "two
packages wrapped in green opaque plastic" in the trunk of the automobile; upon unwrapping them, the police discovered fifteen pounds of
marihuana subsequently used to convict Robbins. 48 The New York patrolmen went no further than the back seat where they found, in a zippered pocket of Belton's leather jacket, some cocaine.4 9 Both defendants
43 Compare People v. Ciochon, 319 N.E.2d 332 (Il1.App. 1974) with United States v. Kim,
415 F. Supp. 1252 (D. Hawaii 1976).
44 See United States v. Carriger, 541 F.2d 545 (6th Cir. 1976); State v. Crider, 341 A.2d 1
(Me. 1975).
45 See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213-14 (1979); LaFave, "Case-by CaseAdjudication" versus "StandardizedProcedures"'The Robinson Dilemna, 1974 Sup.CT.REV. 127, 142, cited
in New York v. Belton, 101 S. Ct. 2860, 2863 (1981).
46 101 S.Ct. 2841 (1981) [Robbins].
47 101 S.Ct. 2860 (1981) [Belton].
48 Robbins, 101 S.Ct. at 2844 (opinion of Stewart, J.).
49 Belton, 101 S.Ct. at 2862.

1156

DAVID L BAZELON

[Vol. 72

asked the Court to order suppression of the drugs. Robbins won; Belton
lost.
The two cases badly divided the Court, together producing ten
opinions.50 Justice Stewart wrote the prevailing opinion in both decisions. In Robbins, writing for himself and Justices Brennan, White, and
Marshall, he held that the "automobile exception" to the fourth amendment's warrant requirement does not justify a warrantless search of a
closed container found inside an automobile. 5 ' Justice Stewart reasoned
that the basis of the automobile exception-the inherent mobility of
cars and the lesser expectation of privacy in their contents---does not
apply to "closed pieces of luggage." 52 He further decided, principally in
order to establish a bright line, that the fourth amendment protects
53
closed containers of whatever sort and wherever found.
In Belton, Justice Stewart wrote for a majority consisting of himself,
Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist.
This time the question concerned the "arrest exception" to the warrant
requirement. Here, Justice Stewart concluded that the purposes of that
rule-the need to prevent arrestees from escaping, harming or destroying evidence-applied to the passenger compartment of an automobile
since that area generally falls within the immediate control of the arrestee.5 4 Once again seeking to articulate a bright line, Justice Stewart
determined that the fourth amendment does not protect anything found
55
within that area, including closed containers.
For the externalist, cases like these pose a conflict between the needs
of law enforcement and the freedom of innocent citizens. Thus, the line
should be drawn at a point that will maximize efficient police work
50 See note 55 Jafra.
51 Robbins, 101 S. Ct. at 2844-46.
52 Id. at 2845.
53 Id. at 2846.
54 Belton, 101 S. Ct. at 2864.
55 Id. In separate opinions, the other Justices expressed a variety of views on Justice Stewart's two bright lines. Justice Powell agreed that the "practical necessity" of arrest situations
justified the clear rule in Belton, 101 S. Ct. at 2848 (Powell, J., concurring), but, concurring in
Robbins, contended that the privacy interests in containers searched pursuant to automobile
stops should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Id. Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist also
joined the opinion in Beiton but dissented in Robbins, arguing that the automobile exception
should permit searches of all effects found within the car. Id. at 2851 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), 2851-55 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens agreed with this latter view and
would have employed it to uphold the searches in both cases. Id. at 2855-59 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Finally, Justices Brennan, White, and Marshall, who helped form the plurality in
Robbins, dissented in Briton, contending that the arrest exception should be strictly limited to
searches of the area in the defendant's immediate control. Belton, 101 S.Ct. at 2865-70
(Brennan, J., dissenting), 2870 (White, J., dissenting). Thus, all of the Justices who wrote
opinions but one approved bright lines in both cases; yet only Justice Stewart adopted the
lines which prevailed in each.
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without seriously threatening "legitimate" privacy interests. Searches
that produce marihuana or cocaine are clearly "efficient" means of identifying drug offenders. And there can be little "legitimate" privacy interest in contraband-or in evidence of a crime for that matter. Thus,
in those situations where warrants are not required, if the police have
"probable cause" to believe the defendant is guilty of something, there
should be virtually no limit to the scope of the search. The officer
should be allowed to inspect everything on the scene, "including the
glove compartment, the trunk, and any containers in the vehicle that
56
might reasonably contain the contraband."
The innocent have nothing to fear, on this view. Subsequent judicial
review of "probable cause" determinations will discourage indiscriminate invasions of privacy, permitting searches only of the possessions of
people who are probably guilty. Thus, a line drawn far from the original purposes of the rule serves both efficient law enforcement and the
externalist goals of the Bill of Rights. This appears to be the analysis
adopted by the Justices who would have sustained the searches in both
cases.57 Indeed, Justice Rehnquist advocated the next logical step.
Since there need be no relationship between the reason for the warrant
exception and the scope of the search, he argued, there is no need for a
58
warrant at all once the police reasonably suspect guilt.
The line-drawing efforts of internalists, in contrast, do not focus exclusively either on promoting the efficiency principle or on protecting
only the "probably" innocent. Instead, interalists seek "bright lines"
which exert moral force-and therefore encourage compliance with the
law both by officers and citizens-because they reflect the realities of
police-suspect confrontations, promote equality in the treatment of suspects of all types, and speak clearly to the community of the values at
stake in such confrontations. Since those who wish to encourage internalization of control have little faith in the ability of the criminal justice
*system to "cure" crime, they are relatively unconcerned if the lines produced by these standards somewhat retard the efficiency of the police in
procuring damaging evidence.
The three Justices who would have struck down the searches in
both Robbins and Belton seem to have been guided by some of these considerations. They recognized that rules of criminal procedure worthy of
moral respect must be based on the facts which generate behavior in the
real world. In Robbins they observed that luggage simply does not exhibit the characteristics of cars that justified the automobile exception:
56 Robbins, 101 S. Ct. at 2855 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
57 Se id. at 2851-55 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), 2155-59 & n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
58 Id. at 2854 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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While both cars and luggage may be 'mobile,' luggage itself may be
. [Furthermore, no] dibrought and kept under control of the police ..
minished expectation of privacy [such as attends cars] characterizes luggage; on the contrary, luggage typically is a repository of personal effects,
from view, and luggage
the contents of closed pieces of luggage are hidden
59
is not generally subject to state regulation.
Similarly, in Belton, Justices Brennan and Marshall rejected as "fiction"
the majority's assumption that everything inside a car lies within the
control of an arrestee and thereby falls within the intent of the arrest
exception.6 0 As Justice Brennan's opinion put it,
[u]nder the approach taken today, the result would presumably be the
same even if Officer Nicot had handcuffed Belton and his companions in
the patrol car before placing them under arrest, and even if his search had
or other inaccessible containers located in the
extended to locked luggage
61
back seat of the car.
These three Justices refused to adopt fictitious portraits of policesuspect confrontations as a means of "providing police officers with a
more workable standard for determining the permissible scope of
searches....*"62 As Justice Brennan noted, "the mere fact that law enforcement may be made more efficient can never by itself justify disregard of the Fourth Amendment. '6 3 The warrant requirement itself
reflects a constitutional choice to sacrifice some degree of efficiency in
law enforcement in favor of strong protection for individual privacy.
The education principle requires that exceptions to that requirement be
constructed in a way that reaffirms the underlying policy. Thus, Justices Brennan, White, and Marshall drew the necessary line nearest to
the "core" of the relevant exception; the purpose of the doctrine defined
its reach. 64 This approach announces clearly that autos and arrests are
special cases. Limiting those exceptions to situations where they are
strictly justified therefore reminds society of the fundamental rule:
searches must ordinarily be authorized by warrants.
Robbins also posed a question implicating the equality principle, although none of the Justices wrote about it in those terms. California
argued that the two plastic bags of marihuana deserved less protection
than, for example, "sturdy luggage, like suitcases."' 65 The plurality rejected this contention on two grounds. First, the fourth amendment
protects people's "effects whether they are 'personal' or 'impersonal.'"
When items are placed in "a closed, opaque container," the owner has
59 Id. at 2845 (opinion of Stewart, J.).
60 Belton, 101 S. Ct. at 2866-70 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
61 Id.

62
63
64
65

at 2868.

Id. at 2869.
Id. at 2869 (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978)).
Id. at 2869.
Robbins, 101 S. Ct. at 2845-46 (opinion of Stewart, J.).

1981]

FOREWORD

1159

"manifested an expectation that the contents would remain free from
public examination. '66 Secondly, there is no principled basis for distin67
guishing the variety of containers people use to hold their belongings.
Before Robbins was decided, our court confronted a case involving a
similar question.68 Like Robbins and Belton, Albert Ross was properly
asked by police to stop his car. After spotting weapons on the front seat,
the officers arrested and handcuffed Ross and then searched the rest of
his car. In the trunk, they found "side by side a closed brown paper sack
about the size of a lunch bag and a zippered red leather pouch."' 69 The
paper bag, police discovered, contained heroin; the leather pouch contained $3200 in cash. The contents of the two receptacles helped convict Ross of a federal narcotics offense.
Under the Supreme Court's decision in Arkansas v. Sanders,70 a precursor to Robbins, the police may not constitutionally search "luggage"
found in properly stopped and searched automobiles without a warrant.
Regarding Ross's red leather pouch as a form of luggage, all of the
judges who originally heard the case agreed that the $3200 in currency
must be suppressed 71 because the police had not obtained a warrant.
The court divided, however, on whether the paper bag fell withifn the
Sanders rule. The panel majority concluded that Ross did not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in his paper bag, partly because "a
reasonable man would [not] identify a paper bag as a normal place to
entrust his intimate personal possessions."' 72 My dissent, 73 and the subsequent opinion of the court en banc,7 4 concluded that the paper bag
was equivalent to the red leather pouch for fourth amendment purposes.
Ross thus posed a classic fourth amendment line-drawing problem.
The amendment clearly protected luggage. The panel majority drew
the line there and excluded paper bags from that protection. While this
line can be faulted for lack of precision, I felt its greater difficulty lay in
its failure to reflect reality and insure equality.
The simple fact is that in some of our subcultures paper bags are often
used to carry intimate personal belongings. And, the sight of some of our
less fortunate citizens carrying their belongings in paper bags is too famil66

Id. at 2846.

67 Id.

68 United States v. Ross, No. 79-1624, slip op. (D.C. Cir. en bane March 31, 1981) (RossI),

eart
granted,50 U.S.L.W. 3278 (Oct. 13, 1981).
69 Ross II, slip op. at 5.
70 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
71 United States v. Ross, No. 79-1624, slip op. at 2 (D.C. Cir. April 17, 1980) (Ross I); id.
at 1 (Bazelon, J., concurring and dissenting), vacatedand rev'd, Ross II.
72 Ross I,slip op. at 14.
73 Ross I, slip op. at 10 (Bazelon, J., concurring and- dissenting).
74 Ross II, slip op. at 4.
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iar to permit such class biases to diminish protection of privacy. 75
In Robbins, 76 Justice Stewart also rejected a "'worthy container'
rule encompassing bags of leather but not of paper." 77 Yet, consistent
with his general approach in both Robbi's and Belton, he seemed to base
this conclusion more on the efficacy of a bright, formal line than on
questions of reality and equality:
[The] Amendment protects people and their effects, and it protects those
effects whether they are 'personal' or 'impersonal.' . . . Once placed
within [a closed, opaque] container, a diary and a dishpan are equally
protected.
[Moreover,] it is difficult if not impossible to perceive any objective
criteria by which [a distinction between suitcases and other containers]
might be accomplished. What one person may put into a suitcase, another
may put into a paper bag. . . . And as the disparate results in the decided
cases indicate, no court, no constable, no citizen, can sensibly be asked to
distinguish the relative "privacy
interests" in a closed suitcase, briefcase,
78
portfolio, duffle bag, or box.
Thus, proponents of the two philosophies of criminal procedure can
arrive at the same bright line for very different reasons. For Justice
Stewart, a "worthy container" rule would simply be incapable of sensible application. It would, in short, violate the efficiency principle. For
me, a fourth amendment line, however bright, that makes "the level of
constitutional protection available to a citizen dependent on his ability
to purchase a fancy repository for his belongings," 79 cannot earn moral
respect.
B.

THE FIFTH AMENDMENT

Some of the most difficult issues in modem criminal procedure concern the privilege against self-incrimination. In particular, Miranda v.
Arizona8s continues to spawn a series of complicated questions. When is
interrogation "custodial"? 81 What is the "functional equivalent" of
questioning? 82 What constitutes sufficient waiver?8 3 Again, my purpose
is not to plumb the details of these questions. Rather, I hope to demonstrate the ways in which the continuing controversy about Miranda implicates choices between the two philosophies of criminal law I have
described.
75
76
77
78
79
80
81

82
83

Ross I, slip op. at 13-14 (Bazelon, J., concurring and dissenting).
101 S. Ct. at 2846 (opinion of Stewart, J.).
Ross II, slip op. at 3.
101 S. Ct. at 2846 (opinion of Stewart, J.).
Ross 1, slip op. at 10 (Bazelon, J., concurring and dissenting).
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
See, e.g., Edwards v. Arizona, 101 S. Ct. 1880 (1981).
See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
See Tague v. Louisiana, 444 U.S. 469 (1980).
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Critics of the criminal justice system often reserve their sharpest attacks for the "Miranda revolution." In an article entitled "Abolish the
5th Amendment," one writer contended that the Amendment's "natural
constituency" consists of sex murderers, "assorted mafiosi, drug smugglers, tax cheats, and labor racketeers. '84 For him, Miranda and its progeny "seem to have as their hidden purpose the maximizing of the
number of times when the Fifth Amendment will be employed by the
guilty to frustrate the police."' 5
The writer's comments are consistent with the "law-as-externalconstraint" hypothesis. An externalist might argue as follows: confessions provide the police with a fast and easy way of obtaining reliable
evidence of crimes. "Innocent" people have nothing to confess and
therefore cannot be harmed by the practice. Miranda inhibits the acquisition of this valuable evidence without any compensating benefit to the
truly innocent. Therefore, the decision diminishes the threat of "swift
and certain punishment" without advancing the guilt-determining
process.
For many years, this approach governed the Supreme Court's evaluation of confession cases. Physical torture obviously offends due process as the Court recognized early on.8 6 Beyond that, the Court's
principal concern seemed to be the risk that confessions derived from
questionable police methods might be unreliable.8 7 Out of this concern
arose the standard which prevailed for many years: if the "totality of
the circumstances" indicated that the suspect's admission was not "voluntary,"8 8 then the confession might befahse. In that event, the interrogation frustrated the externalist goal of separating the guilty from the
innocent. If it were demonstrated that a particular police practice did
not reliably identify the guilty, and caused suffering among the innocent, it would be prohibited.
Beginning in 1961, however, the Court excluded coerced confessions "not because such confessions are unlikely to be true but because
the methods used to extract them offend an underlying principle in the
enforcement of our criminal law: that ours is an accusatorial and not an
inquisitorial system."' 9 Indeed, in one case from that period, the Court
excluded a confession obtained after the suspect had swallowed a truth
Kaus, supra note 32, at 19.
Id. at 18.
86 Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
84

85
87

Ste Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596 (1944); Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547 (1942);

Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940).
88 An example of the application of the "voluntariness" test is Haynes v. Washington, 373
U.S. 503 (1963).
89 Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 541 (1961).
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serum. 90 The shift in emphasis effectively placed a higher priority on
the internalist goal of giving moral force to criminal procedures. This
paved the way for Miranda.
There may be no better example of a criminal procedure decision
that follows the reality, equality, and education principles than Miranda
v. Arizona. Until then, the law, like people generally, simply ignored the
"grim facts" about the "gatehouse" of American criminal procedurethe police station "through which most defendants journey and beyond
which many never get. . ... 9i This violation of the reality principle
made the law of confessions fundamentally amoral:
[S]ociety, by its insouciance, has divested itself of a moral responsibility
and unloaded it on to the police. Society doesn't want to know about
criminals, but it does want them put away, and it is incurious about how
this can be done provided it is done. Thus, society in giving the policeman
power and wishing to ignore what92his techniques must be, has made over
to him part of its own conscience.
In Miranda, the Court confronted the grim facts. In order to arrive at an
"understanding of the nature and setting of. . . in-custody interrogation, ' '93 the Court undertook an extensive examination of reports, cases,
and police manuals. 94 Based on its assessment of the facts, the Court
"concluded that without proper safeguards the process of in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crimes contain inherently
compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual's will to
resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so
95
freely."
Miranda also reflected the equality principle. Those most likely to
suffer coercive police practices behind closed station-house doors are the
poor and uneducated perpetrators of street crime. Educated, "respectable" suspects ordinarily know of their rights to be silent and to retain a
lawyer. By insisting that the disadvantaged be informed of those rights,
by demanding that all suspects be treated with dignity, and by refusing
to admit confessions extracted through police tactics usually reserved for
the deprived, Miranda promised genuine "equal justice before the law."
Finally, the Miranda decision conformed to the education principle.
90 Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
91 See Kamisar, EqualJusticein the Gatehouses and Maarionsof Ameican CriminalProcedure, in
CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN OUR TIME (1965), reprintedin Y. KAMISAR, POLICE INTERROGATION
AND CONFESSIONS 31 (1980).
92 'M4acInnes, The Criminal Socety, in THE POLICE AND THE PUBLIC 101 (C. Rolph ed.
1962), quoted in Y. KAMISAR, POLICE INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 91, at
32.
93 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445 (1966).
94 Id. at 445-56.

95 Id. at 467.
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As Professor Kamisar has noted, before that case the salient features of
stationhouse confessions were
the invisibility of the process--"no other case comes to mind in which an
administrative official is permitted the broad discretionary power assumed
by the police interrogator, together with the power to prevent objective
recordation of the facts"--and the failure of influential groups to identify
with those segments
of our society which furnish most of the raw material
96
for the process.
Miranda recognized that "[p]eople are willing to be complacent about
what goes on in the criminal process as long as they are not too often or
too explicitly reminded of the gory details. ' 97 The decision forced the
previously hidden world of the "gatehouse" into the open. It thus reminded society both of the importance of meaningful constitutional
guarantees and of the fact that the people most in need of those rights
are most often denied them. Miranda'ssuccess as an instrument of education is marked by the fact that every television viewer is familiar with
the required litany of stationhouse rights.
Miranda, then, represents the potential of the law of criminal procedure to exert moral force. Today, the challenge is to ensure that its
promise is fulfilled. There is evidence that many defendants do not understand the Miranda warnings.98 Externalists might regard this as proof
that Miranda is "inefficient," that its "costs" to aggressive law enforcement outweigh its "benefits" in protecting the innocent. But I believe
that this evidence only requires us to work harder at making Miranda
effective. In this endeavor, the standards for finding waivers of the right
to counsel and the right to remain silent have become crucial.
A number of years ago, a case in our court underscored the importance of effective Miranda warnings. 99 The police arrested Eugene Frazier for the robbery of Mike's Carry Out. After they advised him of his
rights and let him read a copy of the Miranda warnings, Frazier signed a
"Consent to Speak" form and told an officer that he understood his
rights and did not want a lawyer. When an officer started questioning
him about Mike's Carry Out, Frazier interrupted and admitted to rob96 Kamisar, A Dissentrobi the MirandaDissents: Some Comments on the "New"Ft/M Amendment
and the Old "Voluntariness" Test, 65 MICH. L. REV. 59, 85 (1966) (quoting Weisberg, Police
InterrogationofArrested Persons: A Skeptical View, 52 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 21, 44 (1961)).
97 Kamisar, id. (quoting Packer, Two Mode/s ofthe Ciminal Process,supra note 3, at 64).
98 See, e.g., Leiken, Police Interrogationin Colorado: The Implementations of Miranda, 47 DENVER LJ. 1, 15-16, 33 (1970); Medalie, Zeitz & Alexander, CustodialPolice Interrogation in 'Our
Nations Capital: The Attempt to Implement Miranda, 66 MICH. L. REV. 1347 (1969); Zeitz,
Medalie & Alexander, Anomie, PowerlessnessandPoliceInterrogation, 60 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 314
(1969). See also 0. STEPHENS, THE SUPREME COURT AND CONFESSIONS OF GUILT 165-200
(1973).
99 United States v. Frazier, 476 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc) (FrazierI), cert. denied,

420 U.S. 977 (1975).
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bing High's Market. The policeman started to transcribe Frazier's remarks, but the defendant stopped him, saying, "Don't write anything
down. I will tell you about this but I don't want you to write anything
down." 0 0
The officer put down the pad and continued listening in silence as
Frazier went on about the High's Market robbery. After about five
minutes of this, Frazier confessed to the robbery of the Meridian Market. Two hours or so later, Frazier ended the questioning, stating
"That's it; that's all I know and that's all I am going to tell you." When
the police asked the defendant to write out his confession or to sign a
typed summary, Frazier refused. "No, I'm not going to sign anything,"
he said. '0
When the case first came to us on appeal from Frazier's conviction
for the Meridian Market robbery, we were troubled by "[t]he strong
implication. . that appellant thought his confession could not be used
against him so long as nothing was committed to writing."' 0 2 We therefore doubted whether the government had carried its "heavy burden" of
establishing that the defendant had "intelligently and knowingly"
waived his rights. 0 3 We remanded, in order to give the Government an
opportunity to present evidence that the waiver was nevertheless valid.
On remand, the trial court concluded that the government had carried
its burden. On a second appeal, the court en banc affirmed. 10 4
I dissented. I emphasized Miranda's teaching that a confession
made in the absence of counsel "can stand if, but only if, the accused
affimatively and understand'ngly waives his rights."'' 0 5 The evidence developed on remand suggested that, far from admonishing Frazier that an
oral confession could be as damaging as a written one, the police
"elected not to risk any clarification for fear [Frazier] would stop talking. 10 6 The majority recognized that the defendant might not have
understood his rights but held, nonetheless, that the government can
meet its burden by showing that the warnings were given and, "if the
issue is raised [,] that the person warned was capable of understanding
u0 7
the warnings.'
In my view, the majority's approach made of Miranda a "preliminary ritual."' 0 8 By ignoring the realities of police interrogation, it de100 Id. at 892-93.
101 Id. at 894 & n.4.
Frazier v. United States, 419 F.2d 1161, 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (Frazier1).
103 Id.
104 FrazierII, 476 F.2d 891.
105 Id. at 904 (Bazelon, J., dissenting) (appendix).
102

106
107

Id. at 900.
Id.

108 Id. at 906 (appendix) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476 (1966)).
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nied people like Frazier genuinely equal treatment before the law:
Of course, the problem posed by this case would not exist if the warnings
were so clear that no one possessing even minimal intelligence could possibly misunderstand them. But capacity to understand the warnings does
not by any means guarantee that they will actually be understood. The
available empirical evidence clearly indicates that many, if not most, defendants do not understand the warnings, even where the defendants are
intelligent and well-educated. The likelihood of understanding is necessarily reduced where, as here, the 28-year old defendant has been afflicted
with sickle cell anemia for many years and used narcotic drugs to mitigate
his pain.
Where the police officers are dealing with ill-educated and uncounseled suspects, they have a special obligation to be alert for signs of misunderstanding or confusion.1l° 9
Miranda continues to pose substantial challenges to the development of a moral criminal law. For many poor and uneducated people,
for example, a variety of confrontations outside of "custodial interrogation" are inherently coercive.1 10 Indeed, state investigations conducted
by officials other than the police-such as psychiatrists examining defendants for sanity"'1 -may pose some of the same dangers. To fulfill
the promise of Miranda, we must always be guided by the reality, equality, and education principles that formed the foundation of that decision. I continue to believe what I wrote in my Frazier opinion:
[T]he Miranda rule reflects a principle fundamental to a democratic society. The Fifth Amendment protects all persons; it ensures that no individual need incriminate himself "unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered
exercise of his own will." Miranda is designed to make that protection
meaningful for the man who has neither the education, the experience, nor
the counsel that would enable him to make an informed decision. Far
from being a mere technicality, it touches the heart of a system of justice
that purports to treat all of its citizens equally under the law.1 12
C.

THE SIXTH AMENDMENT

More than a hundred and seventy years after the adoption of the
sixth amendment, Gideon v. Wainwright 13 breathed life into the right to
counsel by assuring representation for indigents in state trials. Gideon
recognized the realip that, for the poor and uneducated who need lawyers the most, the sixth amendment had offered only barren rhetoric.
The decision promoted genuine equality by requiring the state to furnish
109

Id. at 900, 906 (appendix).

110 Compare United States v. Gallagher, 430 F.2d 1222 (7th Cir. 1970).

111 See, e.., United States v. Byers, No. 78-1451 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 24, 1980). See also Estelle v.

Smith, 101 S. Ct. 1866 (1981).
112 Frazier11, 476 F.2d at 906 (Bazelon, J., dissenting) (appendix).
113 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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counsel to those who could not afford it. It served the education principle
by alerting society both to the importance of legal representation in our
adversary system and to the plight of the disadvantaged. Like Miranda,
Gideon stands as a statement of our highest moral aspirations.
Yet, as with Miranda, the legacy of Gideon continues to demand further effort. What I wrote more than five years ago remains sadly true:
"[A]lthough we generals of the judiciary have designed inspiring insignia for the standard, the battle for equal justice is being lost in the
trenches of the criminal courts where the promise of Gideon . . . goes

unfulfilled."' 14 Time and again, the cases that come before my court
reveal that too often the indigent's lawyer is unequipped to provide even
the most basic protection for the defendant's rights. Too often, the lawyer is either unaware of, or totally indifferent to, the client's fate.
The reality principle demands that we acknowledge the woefully
inadequate representation received by the poor. The equality principle
requires that we lift the burden of defective advocacy that falls largely
on a single subclass of society. The education principle insists that the
courts stimulate a renewed commitment to equal justice by the bar and
by the public. In short, the fundamental sixth amendment challenge
today is to ensure efctive representation of counsel for all members of
society. 115
Externalists might offer a variety of reasons why a serious effort to
remedy ineffective assistance of counsel should not be undertaken. Too
broad a reading of the right to counsel might impair our ability to assure "swift and certain punishment." Justice Frankfurter, for instance,
feared that recognizing certain claims of ineffective assistance "would
furnish opportunities hitherto uncontemplated for opening wide the
prison doors of the land."' 1 6 Furthermore, guaranteeing all defendants
diligent advocates might so impede the courts that the criminal justice
system would grind to a halt. 1 7 And, at bottom, externalists might believe that ineffective assistance is unimportant unless it resulted in the
punishment of an innocent person. This may be why many appellate
courts require claimants to show not only that their constitutional right
to effective counsel was denied but also that the denial was
prejudicial." 18
A recent ineffective assistance of counsel case divided our court very
Gzo. L.J. 811, 811 (1976).
115 Seegenerally Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CINN. L. REV. 1 (1973). See
also Note, Identi.,ingand Remedying Inefective Assistawce of Criminal Defense Counsek A New Look
After UnitedStates v. Decoster, 93 HARv. L. REv. 752 (1980).
116 Foster v. Illinois, 332 U.S. 134, 139 (1947).
117 See Bazelon, sufira note 115, at 24.
118 Id. at 26 & n.70.
114 Bazelon, The Realities of Gideon andAgersinger, 64
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much along these lines. 119 In 1971, Willie Decoster was convicted of
assault with a deadly weapon and aiding and abetting an armed robbery. Decoster's court-appointed counsel neither filed a timely application for bond review nor obtained a transcript of the preliminary
hearing. Furthermore, he failed to interview a single witness-including
120
three prosecution witnesses-before the trial.
In a 1973 panel decision, Decoster 1,121 we remanded for rehearing
on the issue of defense counsel competency, and granted Decoster's appellate counsel leave to move for a new trial. In our decision, we set
forth a revised standard to govern appellate review of ineffective assistance claims: "A defendant is entitled to the reasonably competent
assistance of an attorney acting as his diligent conscientious advocate." 122 To give practical content to this rule, we employed specific
guidelines based on the American Bar Association's Standards for the
Defense Function as the minimal components of "reasonably competent
assistance":
(1) Counsel should confer with his client without delay and as often as
necessary to elicit matters of defense, or to ascertain that potential defenses
are imavailable. Counsel should discuss filly potential strategies and tactical choices with his client.
(2) Counsel should promptly advise his client of his rights and take all
actions necessary to preserve them. . . .Counsel should also be concerned
with the accused's right to be released from custody pending trial, and be
prepared, when appropriate, to make motions for a pretrial psychiatric
examination or for the suppression of evidence.
(3) Counsel must conduct appropriate investigations, both factual and
legal, to determine what matters of defense can be developed. . . . [I]n
most cases, a defense attorney, or his agent, should interview not only his
own witnesses but also those that the government intends to call, when
they are accessible. The investigation should always include efforts to secure information in the possession of the prosecution and law enforcement
authorities. And,
of course, the duty to investigate also requires adequate
123
legal research.
We expressly recognized that these requirements provide only a "starting point for the court to develop, on a case by case basis, clearer guidelines for courts and for lawyers as to the meaning of effective
assistance." 124
Recognizing that merely specifying the requirements for defense
counsel will not alone give force to the sixth amendment, we further
119 Decoster II, 624 F.2d 196 (1979).
120 Id. at 211-13. See also id. at 268-75 (Bazelon, J., dissenting).
121 United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (DeCosterI).
122 Id. at 1202.
123 Id. at 1203-04 (footnotes omitted).
124 Id. at 1203 n.23.
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held that once a substantial and unjustified violation of any of defense
counsel's duties is shown, the court must reverse the conviction unless
the Government can demonstrate that the defendant was not
prejudiced. 125 We thus established a three-step inquiry: "(1) Did counsel violate one of the articulated duties? (2) Was the violation 'substantial?' (3) Has the government established that no prejudice
26
resulted?"1
On remand from our decision, the District Court denied the motion
for a new trial. In 1976, in Decoster J,127 we again reversed the lower
court, concluding that Decoster had been denied the effective assistance
of counsel. The full Circuit Court vacated the decision and reopened
the matter for rehearing en banc. In Decoster 111,128 the court upheld
Willie Decoster's conviction. The plurality held that for a conviction to
be reversed for ineffective assistance, the defendant must demonstrate "a
serious incompetency [falling] measurably below the performance ordinarily expected of fallible lawyers."' 29 It further held that the sufficiency of defense counsel's pretrial investigation must be judged on a
case-by-case basis and may be viewed in the light of the strength of the
government's case.130 The plurality thus rejected the application of categorical standards, characterizing the ABA criteria as partially "aspirational."' 13 1 With respect to prejudice, the plurality required the
defendant to show that his counsel's performance was likely to have af32
fected the outcome.'
I dissented, adhering to the standards I had developed in my opinion for the court in Decoster 1. In my view, the court's new standards
violated the reality and equality principles:
Because my colleagues in the majority divorce their analysis from the economic and social reality underlying the problem of ineffective assistance of
counsel, their decision leaves indigent defendants nothing more than an
empty promise in place of the Sixth Amendment's commitment to adequate representation for all defendants, rich and poor. At best, the majority's approach might help to rectify a few cases of blatant injustice. But
their standards do nothing to help raise the quality of representation provided the poor to a level anywhere approaching that of the more affluent.
On the contrary, my colleagues condone callous, back-of-the-hand representation by dismissing the basic duties of competent lawyering as "aspira125 Id. at 1204.
126 See DecosterIII, 624 F.2d at 275 (Bazelon, J., dissenting).
127 United States v. Decoster, No. 72-1283 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 19, 1976) (DecosterII) (vacaledand
reo'd., Decoster III.).
128 624 F.2d 196.
129 Decoster III, 624 F.2d at 208 (opinion of Leventhal, J.).
130 Id. at 210.
131 Id. at 203, 205.
132 Id. at 208.
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tional." The majority thus provides
33 no incentive or structure to improve
the caliber of defense advocacy.
I argued that the sixth amendment right to counsel should be understood not simply as a means of assuring "a fair trial in the case of any
particular defendant," but as a way of minimizing the disparity in the
quality of representation afforded indigents and nonindigents. 134 The
guarantee of effective assistance of counsel cannot be accomplished unless courts assure competent representation for all criminal
35
defendants. 1
Ultimately, as I noted in Decoster, "the problem of inadequate representation of the indigent cannot be solved by the courts alone."'1 36 No
amount of rhetoric from appellate courts will assure defendants effective
representation unless trial judges, the bar, and the public at large recognize the fundamental importance of enforcing the sixth amendment.
The Supreme Court has stated that trial judges must zealously "maintain proper standards of performance by attorneys who are representing
defendants in criminal cases in their courts."' 137 And, as I commented in
Decoster, "[t]he bar certainly must increase its efforts to monitor the performance of its members and to take appropriate disciplinary action
against those attorneys who fail to fulfill their obligations to their clients."' 138 In the end, of course, there can be no substitute for legislative
action. Money is needed to attract more experienced appointed lawyers
and public defenders, to make public defender positions economically
viable career posts, to provide initial and ongoing training for inexperienced lawyers both in and out of defender offices, and to create more
defender positions.
The fact that the ultimate solution may not be within the powers of
the criminal law, however, "does not justify our ignoring the situation
nor our accepting it as immutable." 39 In the sixth amendment, as elsewhere in criminal procedure, the law must be guided by the education
principle. It must alert the public to "the sordid reality that the kind of
slovenly, indifferent representation provided Willie Decoster is uniquely
the fate allotted to the poor."l 4° It must constantly impress upon the
society the importance of effective assistance of counsel. For as Justice
Schaefer of Illinois has written, "[o]f all the rights that an accused person has, the right to be represented by counsel is by far the most perva133

Id. at 266 (Bazelon, J., dissenting).

134 Id.
135 Id.
136

Id. at 299.

137 McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970). Set Bazelon, supra note 114, at 830.
138
139
140

DecosterIII, 624 F.2d at 299 (Bazelon, J., dissenting).
Id. at 300.
Id. at 264.
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sive, for it affects his ability to assert any other rights he may have."1 4 1
IV.

CONCLUSION

As the public's understandable terror of street crime grows, the
pressure to adopt ever-harsher measures will increase. Many such measures have been offered in recent months in the name of efficiency and
finality. These programs may or may not achieve "swift and certain
punishment." But any order they produce is likely to be brief and violent. For, as I have argued, criminal procedures can be neither moral
nor effective unless they at least encourage people to internalize the
commands of the law.
Ultimately, however, no amount of tinkering with the criminal justice system will provide a meaningful and lasting solution to the
nightmare of street crime. As long as the conditions that breed that
kind of crime continue, the nightmare will continue. A genuine attack
on the roots of crime would not, of course, be cheap or easy. It might
force us to reconsider the entire structure of our society. And it might
conflict with other deeply-held values such as privacy and autonomy.
Indeed, after fully examining the realities of street crime, we may find
ourselves faced with an agonizing choice: continued crime or social and
economic revolution.
Our alternatives are no less agonizing, however, because we ignore
them. Unless we summon the courage to face the painful realities of
street crime, our efforts to "solve" the problem amount to a tragic charade. The criminal law cannot change social conditions but it can force
those conditions onto the public consciousness. By remaining constantly
sensitive to the realities of social and economic deprivation, to the promise of genuine equality, and to the fundamental values underlying the
Bill of Rights, the law can help society see the imperative of linking
criminal justice with social justice. Society might then pursue an enduring social tranquility worthy of our highest moral aspirations.

141 Schaefer, Federalism and State CriminalProcedure,70 HARV. L. REv.

1, 8 (1956).

